

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

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LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON CHIEF

MAJOR GENERAL WILTON B. PERSONS, Chief, Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department, was commissioned in 1917 in the Coast Artillery Corps. He served in France from 1918 to 1919. Upon his return to the United States, he was assigned to Signal operations and was transferred to the Signal Corps in 1923. He was graduated from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1931, and was assigned to the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. In 1933 he was appointed to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War where, among other duties, he served as liaison officer with the Military Affairs Committee, House of Representatives. He was graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1938 and from the Air Corps Tactical School in 1939, and was assigned for duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff, handling War Department General Staff liaison with Congress. He became Chief of the Liaison Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, in December 1941 and was appointed to his present duty in March 1942.

INFORMING THE CONGRESS

By

MAJOR GENERAL WILTON B. PERSONS

Chief, Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department

BEFORE the war, we had an Army of between 100,000 and 200,000 men. That Army made little impact on the public; the average citizen rarely saw a soldier. Today, with well over a million men and women in uniform, the Army reaches into every town and into most of the homes of the country. We, in the military service, pay the price of being a "people's" Army; and it is a price worth paying. It means that the public, who are our bosses, are acutely aware of us and want to know about us. It is up to us—all of us—to tell them, honestly and without cavil.

The public, in turn, tells us how we are doing and what they expect of us. The instrument they use for doing this is the Congress. The Congress, too, is acutely aware of us. It wants to know about us, so that it can determine, for the people, what we are to do or not to do. The spot light of Congress is always on us; as it should be. It is not, as many suspect, a spot light turned on merely to pick out our flaws; it is also a bright light to illuminate the plans and the achievements of the Army for protecting the Nation. Congress, like the people it represents, is proud of the Army; but it insists that its pride be justified by our behavior. Through the press, through letters from its constituents, through Congressional investigations, it continually watches our behavior. If that behavior is exemplary, we have nothing to fear; or, if we learn from our mistakes—and there are many of them in an Army of a million or more—Congress and the public may be sympathetic; for Congressmen, after all, are intensely human. But we must

play fair; any attempt to hide the truth, any indication that the Army is engaging in politics or is lobbying, and our good reputation, like a house of cards, slithers to our feet.

The Army's official relationship with the Congress (except in budgetary matters) is expressed through the Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department. Originally consisting of a major and a handful of clerks, it has grown to be a special staff division. The primary mission of the Legislative and Liaison Division is to provide information to the Congress; thus completing the three-fold responsibility of the Chief of Public Information: to provide information to the public through the Public Relations Division; to troops through the Information and Education Division; and to the Congress through the Legislative and Liaison Division.

There are a score of facets to the business of supplying information to Congress. The Liaison Branch handles daily a steady stream of letters from constituents to their Congressmen, of telephone calls from harried legislators inquiring about everything from the proposed inactivation of an Army post to the soldier constituent who wants to bring back a monkey from the jungles. Then there are the kinds of information that a Congressional committee must have in order to conduct a fair investigation of suspected mismanagement by the Army, or a reported miscarriage of military justice. The facts are always forthcoming; and only the facts, not opinions. The facts come through a single source, the L&L Division, so that there is no disparity, and so that the Congressman has all he needs, when he needs it. In the old days, legend has it, a Congressman would write or telephone for information to six different sources in the War Department and receive six different and unrelated answers. Frequently, all a Congressman wants to know is What is War Department policy? or, How do the regulations read on that point? He does not expect the Army to deviate from established policy, or to play favorites.

In providing information, the initiative does not always come from the Congress. A specific responsibility of the Secretary of War is to prepare plans and present a program of national defense. Here the War Department, through the Legislative and Liaison Division, takes the initiative. Staff plans are continually being drawn and revised, and are finally coordinated through the Legislative and Liaison Division. But plans are not enough; they must be translated into a proposed legislative


program. Some parts of the overall plan now being presented to the 80th Congress may need no legislative action; an executive order may be sufficient. Other parts will have to be drawn into bills, or a single bill, for presentation to the respective houses of Congress. These matters, and such considerations as priority and timing, also enter into the judgment which the experts in the L&L Division must exercise in order to give the Congress a complete and workable program. Another consideration is coordination with other Governmental agencies which the proposed military legislation may affect, or in which they may share. The Legislative and Liaison Division serves as a monitor in insuring full coordination of the War Department's legislative program with other agencies of the Government.

Another function of the Legislative and Liaison Division is to arrange Congressional tours of inspection, so that Members of Congress can get information about the Army at first hand. From the Army's point of view, that is an effective way of providing information. From the point of view of the Congressman, it is an efficient way of his getting at the heart of a complex problem on which he will have to vote.

Although the Legislative and Liaison Division has no personnel in the field, although it does not appear in any Table of Organization, its mission is close to the professional interest of every member of the military profession. Without the work of the L&L Division, it would be practically impossible for Congress to know the facts on which to base its decisions; it would be difficult for Congress to determine military policies of vital importance to the Nation; and there would be no clear channel of direction from the people of the country to their Army.


In interpreting the Army to the Congress, there is one characteristic of the military profession that carries us through the stormiest attacks and the direst misunderstandings; that is, the fundamental integrity of the Army and of its officers and men. In spite of the occasional scoundrel in uniform, the conviction is there and is justified—that military men are jealous of their integrity. Some are brilliant; some are not. Some are more industrious than others. Some exercise poor judgment. But extremely few of them are rascals. The Congress and the people believe that. We must sustain their faith.

The Military Policy Team



THE PRESIDENT

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THE SECRETARY OF WAR

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THE CONGRESS

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A Special Section

on

LEGISLATION

AND THE NEW ARMY

Foreword

THESE are critical days in our history. If American civilization is to endure, we must be ready to defend it. This is history's greatest lesson for the United States; but unfortunately we are inclined to be a forgetful and complacent people. Shall we again disarm, trusting to Providence and luck? Or shall we proceed prudently, in the habit of the early Puritans, carrying our arms as we go soberly to the house of prayer and peace? That is the choice. That is the decision Americans must make.

The 80th Congress, now in session, will determine the military policy upon which the Nation's future may depend.

It is the President's responsibility, as Chief Executive, to assist in shaping that future by presenting to the Congress the needs of the Nation, with recommendations for legislative action. He calls upon the Secretary of War to provide expert advice, and to give a clear, comprehensive, and honest statement of the military needs of the country.

It is the War Department's responsibility to bring to bear all of its professional skills and judgment on a plan that makes sense and that will insure our way of life. In presenting its plans and recommendations, it is the duty of the War Department to make certain that the Congress has all the pertinent facts, and that it understands the military implications inherent in negative action. Its job is solely a professional one—to provide expert advice, unbiased and objective. The final decision rests with the Congress.

Once the Congress has determined what the military policy shall be, and what kind and size of Army the people want to have, it is then the responsibility of the Army to employ its energy, initiative, and imagination in implementing that policy.

It is the duty of every officer to become familiar with the proposals for military legislation before the Congress, now and as they develop; and to use every proper opportunity to present the facts to the public. It is equally the responsibility of every commander to keep his troops informed, and to make sure that every soldier understands what the Army of the future will be, and what role he will play in it.

In the following pages, the basic plans and recommendations of the War Department are presented and discussed. These pages may serve as a source of information for the public and the troops. In later issues of THE DIGEST, further legislative proposals and developments will be described.

J. LAWTON COLLINS

*Lieutenant General, United States Army
Chief of Public Information
War Department*

THE OVERALL PROGRAM

OUT of 48 War Department-sponsored bills submitted to the 79th Congress, 33 were enacted. Among those which failed to pass were such vitally important measures as Unification of the Armed Forces, Universal Military Training, and Retirement and Elimination of Officers.

The most important lesson to be learned from these failures is that the legislative program as a whole was based on a piecemeal plan and was defeated in detail. Repeatedly, during Congressional hearings, the War Department was asked to explain the relation of individual bills to partially completed overall plans. Consequently, it was determined that the entire military legislative program to be presented to the 80th Congress must be fully coordinated and planned in advance; and that questions, which for one reason or another could not be answered previously, must be fully resolved before presenting a program to the Congress and the public again.

Based on War Department experience in the 79th Congress, it was decided that all bills affecting the military policy of the United States should be organized into two major groupings:

1. The National Security Program, covering that part of the overall military program which transcends purely War Department interests and vitally affects other executive departments and our entire civil economy, such as Unification of the Armed Forces, and Universal Military Training.

2. The War Department's Program for a Postwar Military Establishment, covering Army and Air interests.

It was also decided to achieve in advance the fullest possible coordination and singleness of purpose among the top levels in the War and Navy Departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congressional leaders. The War Department, furthermore, is seeking the fullest practicable coordination with veterans' associations and civilian components of the Army. Finally, of course, it is necessary to achieve full public understanding through an adequate information program.

The National Security Program includes measures to which

TENTATIVE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE 80th CONGRESS

A THE NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

1. UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
2. UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING
3. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION MEASURES

B THE WAR DEPARTMENT PROGRAM FOR THE POSTWAR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

1. ORGANIZATION

- a. Title I Army
- b. Title II Air Force
- c. Title III NG
- d. Title IV ORC
- e. Title V Common Overhead
and Services

2. PERSONNEL

- a. Title I Strengths
- b. Title II Promotion,
Retirement and
Elimination
- c. Title III Pay and
Allowances
- d. Title IV Procurement of
Personnel

3. MILITARY JUSTICE

(Revision of Articles of War
& Manual for Courts-Martial)

4. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

5. PERMANENT SUPPLY & SERVICES

- a. Title I Procurement
- b. Title II Permanent
Construction
- c. Title III Maintenance &
Other Services
- d. Title IV Disposal of
Property

6. CURRENT OPERATIONS

the President gave his approval in the past session of Congress. The first two measures—Unification and Universal Military Training—were specifically included in his message to that Congress.

In his message to the 80th Congress, the President again presented those measures, recommending that a bill for unification of the armed forces be given early consideration. Because of manpower implications, which will be discussed later, he also asked for high priority on consideration of a possible extension of the Selective Service Act. The high priority on unification is obviously of key importance to the remainder of the War Department's legislative program. All bills on the Postwar Military Establishment (the War Department's program) have been prepared, necessarily, on the assumption that the unification bill will be considered by the Congress first, and will be favorably acted on, before other measures are enacted. For example, separate legislation must be prepared for the Army and Air components under any unification bill which may be passed.

Measures included in the War Department's Program for the Postwar Military Establishment may be classified under six broad headings, as on the accompanying chart. Each may be broken down into titles which will be applicable to narrower subjects, which can be submitted and enacted separately, at the discretion of the Congress. In addition to these bills, designed to implement broad sections of the overall plan and to establish more or less permanent organization and procedures, there are, of course, the annual appropriation and deficiency bills.

It is difficult to imagine the profound, chaotic effect of returning the Army to a peacetime status under legislation now on the books, if the wartime directives should be abolished by putting an end to the President's emergency powers. The Army would return overnight to a strength of 162,000 men; the Army Air Forces would go out of existence; most of the Army's important installations would be closed; all occupation troops would have to be returned; and all temporary ranks would be abolished.

The total effect of the current War Department legislative program—planned and projected—will be to recodify the military laws of the United States. So far as it is practicable, these bills will specifically repeal all previous statutes on the subjects to which they pertain, re-enacting in identical lan-

guage those which require no amendment. That is the goal, although the time element will doubtless prevent complete codification in the first session of the 80th Congress. The program involves more than a rewriting of the National Defense Act. It furnishes the basis for an effective, modern military establishment—one that can protect our Nation and its commitments in any emergency in the foreseeable future. The program is flexible and adaptable. All bills are drafted in phraseology as broad as possible, leaving the maximum practicable administrative discretion to the President and to the Secretaries of National Defense, Army, Navy, and Air.

As is well known, dollars will be the ultimate controlling factor in effecting real national security. The people and the Congress will not approve adequate enabling legislation or, what is more important, adequate annual appropriations, unless they are convinced that the nature and degree of possible threats to the national security warrant the necessary grants of authority and dollars to "the military." However alarmed the military may be by the facts of the present world situation, their judgment and motives may be suspect on the basis of alleged jingoism. We can plan and ask honestly; but in the last analysis, our fate and the Country's fate depend on how well and accurately the facts are gathered, presented, and understood. The presentation of these facts is necessarily largely out of military hands and within the hands of the State Department and other civilian agencies of the Government. If some plan for informing the public of the true international situation is effective, the armed forces may be assured the necessary men and money to insure the national security. Without adequate public support, the armed forces will not get the necessary money to establish a sound military structure; and our future security may again rest on the gamble of whether or not the people will become alarmed enough in time enough.

AID

POSTWAR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

THE problem faced in planning for the Postwar Military Establishment is the translation of the world situation into a military policy; a conversion of that policy into specific basic tasks; and finally the determination of the amount of men, money, and resources required to carry out those tasks.

Our military policy is best expressed in the broad mission of the armed forces:

1. To participate, as directed, in international programs for preserving world peace and security.

2. To maintain the ability to take swift counteroffensive action, if necessary, in support of the United States' position in world councils.

3. To provide for security of the United States in case of failure of world peace programs.

These broad missions are subdivided into the following basic tasks of the Army:

- a. Participation in the occupation and in the civil and economic rehabilitation of Germany and Japan.

- b. Maintenance of forces in the United States to support occupation.

- c. Provision of the United States component of a United Nations Security Force.

- d. Maintenance of a system of bases.

- e. Development and maintenance of an efficient intelligence organization.

- f. Maintenance of supremacy in research and development.

- g. Provision of mobile striking forces-in-being, to attack key installations or to seize and occupy areas vital to any aggressor nation.

- h. Provision of adequately trained reserves, to augment forces required for immediate action in the event of war.

- i. Provision for civil defense.

- j. Provision for rapid total mobilization of all national resources for final decisive action.

Clearly, the primary task of the Army at this time is occupation. Last Spring, Secretary of War Patterson and General Eisenhower told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that an Army of 1,070,000 effectives would be required on 1 July 1947, and thereafter for as long as we have occupation forces overseas. This figure was based upon certain assumptions:

1. That the occupation is peaceful;
2. That the Allies share the occupation responsibility;
3. That we have continued use of prisoners of war and foreign nationals, according to plan;
4. That disposal of surplus property is expedited;
5. That peace treaties are consummated; and
6. That the United Nations organization is effective.

Failure to meet any of these conditions imposes an added task on the Army, for which additional strength is required. For example, we now have 28,000 troops in Italy and 13,000 in Austria—allocations which were not included as a part of the 1,070,000-man plan.

Although the War Department does not consider that war is inevitable, it does recognize that fundamental conflicts of purpose still exist between great military powers, and that a major conflict can occur at any time in the future. We must plan on the basis of the capabilities of potential aggressor nations rather than on estimates of probable intention. In sober consideration of this factor, the War Department has arrived at certain conclusions.

We must constantly maintain efficient forces in being, while at the same time we have the plans, the organization, and the resources to meet emergency requirements. Plans for the *peacetime* Army must be made in the light of plans for the *occupation* Army and the *mobilization* Army, and must be integrated with those plans. In addition, Army plans must be integrated with the plans and operations of the Navy. In the absence of unification, such integration would prove increasingly difficult.

If we prepare for war, we must prepare for a total war. It has for some time been an accepted assumption that the next war will come with a heavy surprise attack. Such an attack would be designed to destroy or paralyze our abilities, in order to force a quick surrender. On the other hand, the enemy might choose to forego the advantages of surprise in order, first, to gain closer bases and a more favorable position by ef-

forts other than military. Whatever enemy strategy is actually adopted, we must be prepared for a devastating initial attack.

With this prospect of a Pearl Harbor infinitely more staggering than the original, it becomes imperative that the Army maintain at all times a close liaison with industry, and that the Nation's industrial potential be kept up-to-date in all planning. At best, it takes years in peacetime to develop a vital new weapon, from the pilot model to the hands of troops trained in its use. Avoiding a future Pearl Harbor may mean firing the first shot on the production line as much as three years before the first bomb hits us. It is estimated that, within the next year or so, atomic warfare, guided missiles, biological warfare, and extended capabilities of air power will bring about changes in the composition and equipment of our forces, as well as in our strategy. If we once lose the lead in the development of new weapons, those same weapons in the hands of the enemy may prevent us from ever regaining our position.

Total war calls for total mobilization. According to the present program, the War Department plans to attain a total of 5½ million men as the first mobilization target. As a further mobilization target, it is planned to have 8 million men under military control at the end of the second period.

While the composition and the functions of the ground, sea, and air team will undoubtedly be modified to meet future developments, especially in science, there is nothing at this time which indicates a major change in the requirements for any of the services, in case war comes in the foreseeable future. The increased tempo of war and the advent of new weapons has increased the importance of maintaining balanced armed forces in a state of complete readiness—forces capable of holding bases; maintaining communications with them; retaining control of strategic land, air, and sea spaces; providing immediate defense against air and surface attacks; organizing offensive action by striking forces; and seizing and occupying the sources of attack.

Finally, a major concern in both defensive and offensive planning must be adequate provision for combating fifth-column activity. Sabotage, subversion, strikes, and civil unrest can disrupt mobilization, home defense measures, and ultimately the overall war effort. The urgent need for dis-

ciplined civilian groups, to bring order out of the local chaos created by atomic attacks, dictates the absolute necessity for a completely efficient civilian defense organization. It is questionable, however, whether such an organization can be prepared in peacetime, capable of meeting the initial peak load of an emergency. Hence, it must be assumed that part of this load will fall on the armed forces, with a consequent increase in military requirements or a retardation in mobilization.

AID

PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON MILITARY POLICY

We live in a world in which strength on the part of peace-loving nations is still the greatest deterrent to aggression. World stability can be destroyed when nations with great responsibilities neglect to maintain the means of discharging those responsibilities.

This is an age when unforeseen attack could come with unprecedented speed. We must be strong enough to defeat, and thus to forestall, any such attack. In our steady progress toward a more rational world order the need for large armed forces is progressively declining, but the stabilizing force of American military strength must not be weakened until our hopes are fully realized.

*Extracted from the address of
the President of the United States
to the Congress, 6 January 1947*

ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

IN considering our military manpower requirements, it is not enough to think only in terms of the Regular Army. One of our main objectives must be to develop, rapidly, an effective National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps. An *M-Day force in being* of approximately 1,750,000 men is necessary (*M-Day* representing the day on which we are attacked or on which hostilities are declared to exist). At present there is no semblance of an effective National Guard or Organized Reserve Corps, and it is increasingly evident that it will be difficult to maintain an effective Regular Army of even 1,070,000 men during the period of occupation. Consequently, we find ourselves critically short of the forces needed to meet any crisis.

The Regular Army within the continental limits of the United States is barely adequate for its job of serving our overseas forces and maintaining a very small general reserve. If we were plunged into war, we would have neither the force necessary to control emergency situations in critical industrial areas that might be attacked through the air, nor sufficient troops to prevent even elementary sabotage at critical points in our industrial, transportation, and communications systems. Hence the mobilization ability of the civilian components is a matter of primary concern to the War Department and to the Nation.

Analyzing our needs, we list first a postwar Regular Army of 875,000, including ten divisions and 70 air groups. (Additional requirements for occupation forces have added 195,000, giving us the 1,070,000-man Army, often referred to as the "Interim Army.") Next, we need a National Guard of 680,000—three times the strength of the pre-war Guard—containing 27 divisions, 27 air groups, and various other elements, immediately available on *M-Day*. Finally, we need an Organized Reserve Corps of around 876,000 men in units (25

Summary of Manpower Requirements

POSTWAR ARMY

M-Day Immediate Effectives

875,000	RA, all (<i>See footnote</i>)
680,000	NG, all
195,000	ORC, part
<hr/>	
1,750,000	Total effective force on day hostilities begin

M-Day Organized Manpower

875,000	RA, all
680,000	NG, all
876,000	ORC, including 195,000 immediate effectives
<hr/>	
2,431,000	Total effectives

M-Day Plus 1 Year (Trained Manpower)

875,000	RA, all
680,000	NG, all
195,000	ORC, immediate effectives
3,750,000	Balance ORC; draft
<hr/>	
5,500,000	Manpower pool, first year

NOTE: Add 195,000 to RA, making total 1,070,000—"Interim Army," during occupation.

Factors militating against M-Day force, fiscal year 1948:

- UMT trainers, 134,000 additional troops (assuming adoption of UMT).
- Replacements for anticipated losses during year
— 400,000.
- NG and ORC shortages.

divisions and 38 air groups), of which 195,000 would be Class A (fully organized) units, immediately available on M-Day. These three elements—Regular Army of 875,000; National Guard of 680,000; and 195,000 from Organized Reserve Corps units—will total 1,750,000 troops, completely organized, trained, and equipped, ready for immediate commitment. At full strength—that is, including the entire Organized Reserve Corps of 876,000—the force of the three major components of the Army of the United States will total approximately 2,500,000.

However, our ability to organize a total of 1,750,000 M-Day effectives is doubtful for the fiscal year 1948. The following factors militate against reaching this goal:

- (1) 134,000 additional troops will be needed as a cadre for Universal Military Training, assuming the adoption of UMT.

- (2) Roughly 400,000 enlistees and reenlistees will be needed as replacement for losses during the year.

- (3) Shortages due to the inability of the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps to meet M-Day requirements are anticipated.

Assuming, however, that a total of 1,750,000 M-Day effectives (Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserve Corps) would be available, an augmentation pool of 3,750,000 additional trained men would be necessary (1) to bring the various components up to full strength, (2) to provide for replacements, and (3) to provide for wartime expansion during the first year of hostilities. This augmentation of 3,750,000 would include the Organized Reserve Corps and men received through some form of compulsory service. In short, total requirements for trained military manpower during the first year of hostilities, assuming that our current military obligations continue, would be 5,500,000 men.

What can be done to meet these manpower requirements?

Due to age and other factors, the number of available war-trained veterans is expected to dwindle rapidly. Even from this reservoir, men are not now responding in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps. The National Guard probably can be recruited to only about 50 per cent of its authorized strength of 680,000 without the aid of Universal Military Training, or some type of compulsory service, or greatly increased benefits. The Organized Reserve Corps likewise will suffer. It is important that the service-type units in the Organized Reserve Corps—units not normally found in the National Guard—be

fully manned, to the extent of some 200,000 men during peacetime, as a component of a balanced M-Day force. But not more than 50,000 can be expected to enroll under a volunteer system which provides no emoluments of any kind. With drill pay, the requirements might be met; not only for service-type units, but for all types of Organized Reserve Corps units. But only with Universal Military Training, or with some form of compulsory service, can the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps be organized and maintained at full strength.

Regular Army enlistments have been gratifying, but, despite the best recruiting record that any Army has ever attained, the total number of enlistments is less than required, and is continually decreasing. It is expected that the strength of the Regular Army through volunteer enlistments will decline within the next two to three years to possibly 600,000. A continuation of Selective Service, or some form of compulsory military training, therefore, is essential to the maintenance of a million-man Army.

Procurement of officers presents no serious problem. The 50,000-officer limit for the Regular Army will be reached without difficulty; and there has been generous response from National Guard and Reserve officers to the request that they stay on extended active duty. To those officers who stay on duty for longer periods, the Government should grant some gratuity, either upon completion of service, or upon earlier release. No difficulty is anticipated in securing the necessary number of officers for the National Guard. With respect to officers for the Organized Reserve Corps, however, experience shows that a shortage will exist after a few years, particularly in the junior grades. Unless drill pay, allowances, or some other incentive is provided, it probably never will be possible to secure enough Reserve officers to make *any* training effective. The commissioning of 100,000 Reserve officers yearly is the goal which should be sought by the Army. A small proportion of these would be commissioned in the Regular Army; many thousands would be required for extended active duty with the Army, as far in the future as can be foreseen; other thousands would be needed in Reserve units.

While more than 500,000 three-year enlistees have been recruited to date, nearly half of these are in the Army Air Forces. The picture, so far as the ground arms are concerned, particularly the Infantry, is not at all bright. By 31 December 1946, the Pacific theater had suffered nearly a 100 per cent

manpower turnover; and at present less than one-fourth of the ground troops in that theater are three-year enlistees.

Long-term enlistments are not only much more desirable, they are far more economical. When a newly-enlisted man has to be trained and transported overseas, the time lost in processing, training, unavoidable delays, and terminal leave reduces by as much as nine months the soldier's period of service on duty with a unit or in a productive job. It costs about \$3,000 a year to pay, feed, clothe, and care for a soldier; and the corresponding cost for an 18-months enlistment, therefore, is \$4,500. Divided by nine months of productive employment, the cost is \$500 per month. Adding the cost of providing benefits for each of these soldiers under the various veterans' services increases the amount by about \$4,500 more, making a total of \$9,000. Consequently, the 18-months enlistee costs the tax-payer about \$1,000 for each month of useful service. The three-year enlistee, on the other hand, even in his original enlistment period, has 27 useful months of service, thereby decreasing the monthly cost considerably. Furthermore, short-term service frequently puts two veterans on the public payroll, compared with one veteran whose service is three years. The advantages to be gained by long-term enlistment are clearly apparent.

The postwar Army must not only sustain the Reserve components and provide a small mobile force; it must also furnish the nucleus around which a major mobilization can be effected. We are definitely not in a position to accomplish this mission today. The inadequacy of our existing force—to fulfill its normal mission, to expand enough to train some millions of men in an emergency, and to carry out other expanding missions—is obvious.

As a sobering final thought, the strength of our military forces on active duty in the United States at the outbreak of World War II was more than twice as great as it will be on 1 July 1947. Furthermore, before Pearl Harbor, our Army consisted largely of combat units; today, it is almost entirely an administrative and logistical supporting force for occupation troops. Except for certain Army Air Forces units, we have almost completely demobilized our Army at home.

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

TOP priority on the list of measures to strengthen national security, the War Department places unification of the armed forces under a single Secretary of National Defense. The decision on this widely discussed subject is the key to much of the legislative program proposed to the 80th Congress.

Current consideration of the subject dates back to 1944, when a special committee of the House requested the War and Navy Departments to present their views. After considerable study, unification bills were introduced in both houses of Congress, but action was taken only in the Senate. In December 1945, the President sent a special message to the Congress endorsing a single department of defense, with three coordinate branches—Army, Navy and Air Force. A revised bill (S. 2044) was introduced in the Senate, but met with disagreement between the two Senate service committees. The President then called upon the Secretaries of War and Navy to adjust their differences; and agreement was reached on eight out of the twelve major points in the revised bill. The President accepted the eight points of agreement and resolved the four in disagreement by a compromise plan. Senate Bill 2044 was re-introduced incorporating these changes, but failed to pass before the 79th Congress adjourned.

Soon after the opening of the 80th Congress, on 16 January 1947, the Secretaries of War and Navy reported to President Truman that they had resolved the views of their departments, and were now prepared to support legislation which would provide for organization of the armed forces under a Secretary of National Defense, with three coordinate branches (Army, Navy and Air Force), the creation of a War Council, the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a full-time representative joint staff, and the establishment of a Council of National Defense, a National Security Resources Board and a Central Intelligence Agency.

The mission and responsibilities of these individuals and agencies are described in the joint letter of the Secretaries to the President, as follows:

Basic Agreement.

a. There shall be a Council of National Defense, a National Security Resources Board and a Central Intelligence Agency (which already exists) as agreed by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in their letter to the President of 31 May 1946. [See explanation on page 27.]

b. The armed forces shall be organized under a Secretary of National Defense so as to place the Army, the Navy (to include the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation), and the Air Force, each with a military chief, under the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force respectively. Each shall be under a Secretary and, under the overall direction of the Secretary of National Defense, shall be administered as an individual unit. The Secretary of any of the three departments may, at any time, present to the President, after first informing the Secretary of National Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his Department which he may deem necessary or desirable

c. A War Council shall be created consisting of the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman and with power of decision, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force, and the military heads of the three Services. The War Council will concern itself with matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.

d. There shall be a Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the military heads of the three Services, and also the Chief of Staff to the President, if that office exists. Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide for the strategic direction of the military forces of the United States, will formulate strategic plans, assign logistic responsibilities to the Services in support thereof, integrate the military requirements and, as directed, advise in the integration of the military budget.

e. There shall be a full-time joint staff to consist initially of not over 100 officers to be provided in approximately equal numbers by the three Services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof, shall carry out policies and directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

f. The Secretary of National Defense shall head the armed

forces establishment, shall be vested with authority, under the President, to establish common policies and common programs for the integrated operation of the three departments and shall exercise control over and direct their common efforts to discharge their responsibility for national security.

Proposed Executive Order. The Secretaries attached to their letter a proposed draft of an executive order which they believe should be issued when legislation on the subject is enacted and approved. This proposed executive order sets forth the roles and missions of the armed forces as agreed upon by the two Secretaries. Under this order, the President would assign the following primary functions and responsibilities to the three armed services:

Section I—Common Missions. The common missions of the Armed Forces of the United States are:

1. To support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic.
2. To maintain, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions and areas vital to its interest.
3. To uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To safeguard the internal security of the United States as directed by higher authority.
5. To conduct integrated operations on the land, on the sea, and in the air, necessary for these purposes.

In order to facilitate the accomplishment of the foregoing missions, the armed forces shall formulate integrated plans and make coordinated preparations. Each service shall observe the general principles and fulfill the specific functions outlined below, and shall make use of the personnel, equipment and facilities of the other services in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased.

Section II—Functions of the United States Army. General. The United States Army includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expan-

sion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

Specific. The specific functions of the United States Army are:

1. To organize, train and equip land forces for:
 - a. Operations on land, including joint operations.
 - b. The seizure or defense of land areas, including airborne and joint amphibious operations.
 - c. The occupation of land areas.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of Army combat and service elements, coordinating with the Navy and Air Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and airborne operations.
3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To assist the Navy and Air Force in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies, as determined by proper authority.

Section III—Functions of the United States Navy. General. The United States Navy includes naval combat and service forces, naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. It is organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat at sea. The Navy is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

Specific. The specific functions of the United States Navy are:

1. To organize, train and equip naval forces for:
 - a. Operations at sea, including joint operations.
 - b. The control of vital sea areas, the protection of vital sea lanes, and the suppression of enemy sea commerce.
 - c. The support of occupation forces as required.
 - d. The seizure of minor enemy shore positions capable of reduction by such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization.
 - e. Naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The air aspects of those functions shall

be coordinated with the Air Force, including the development and procurement of aircraft, and air installations located on shore, and use shall be made of Air Force personnel, equipment and facilities in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased. Subject to the above provision, the Navy will not be restricted as to types of aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes.

f. The air transport necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces where the requirements cannot be met by normal air transport facilities.

2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and the Air Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious operations.

3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.

4. To maintain the United States Marine Corps, the specific functions of which are:

a. To provide Marine forces, together with supporting air components, for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of limited land operations in connection therewith.

b. To develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique and equipment by landing forces.

c. To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy.

d. To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.

e. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.

5. To assist the Army and the Air Force in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

Section IV—Functions of the United States Air Force.
General. The United States Air Force includes all military aviation forces, both combat and service, not otherwise specifi-

cally assigned. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained air offensive and defensive operations. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

Specific. The specific functions of the United States Air Force are:

1. To organize, train and equip air forces for:
 - a. Air operations, including joint operations.
 - b. Gaining and maintaining general air supremacy.
 - c. Establishing local air superiority where and as required.
 - d. The strategic air force of the United States and strategic air reconnaissance.
 - e. Air lift and support for airborne operations.
 - f. Air support to land forces and naval forces, including support of occupation forces.
 - g. Air transport for the armed forces, except as provided by the Navy in accordance with paragraph 1 f, of Section III.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of Air Force combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and Navy on all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and airborne operations.
3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To provide the means for coordination of air defense among all services.
5. To assist the Army and Navy in accomplishment of their missions, including the provisions of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

Agencies Agreed Upon.

In the joint letter quoted above (16 January 1947), the two Secretaries stated their agreement on certain agencies described in their joint letter to the President dated 31 May 1946. In that letter, these agencies are described as follows:

Council of National Defense. To integrate our foreign and military policies and to enable the military services and other agencies of government to cooperate more effectively in matters

involving our national security. The membership of this Council should consist of the Secretary of State, the civilian head of the military establishment, the civilian heads of the military services, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, referred to below.

National Security Resources Board. To establish, and keep up to date, policies and programs for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of our national security. It should operate under the Council and be composed of representatives of the military services and of other appropriate agencies.

Central Intelligence Agency. To compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered by various government agencies, including the military, and to furnish such information to the National Security Council and to other government agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the Council. An organization along these lines, established by executive order, already exists.

AID

IN THE HOUR OF NEED

Throughout the life of this Republic, we have had what is known as the "militia," in which every male citizen capable of bearing arms is charged with the responsibility to protect his country in the hour of need. UMT vitalizes this doctrine.

Extracted from "Universal Military Training"
War Department Public Relations Division pamphlet.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

IN his message to the 79th Congress on 23 October 1945, President Truman outlined a plan for Universal Military Training and asked the Congress to enact a law providing for such training. A bill (HR 515) was considered by the House Military Affairs Committee, but had not been reported out of committee when the 79th Congress adjourned last July. A new plan, which differs only slightly from the President's original recommendations, but which has been developed in more detail, will be presented to the 80th Congress. There has been wide discussion of the War Department plan for UMT, but misunderstanding still persists in the public mind.

George Washington, in his presidential message to the First Congress, proposed a program for peacetime training of a citizen army. Today, with the tempo and concepts of war incredibly changed, the need for a constant reservoir of trained citizens is even more imperative. It would be impossible to mobilize our young men and to train them in the new type of warfare after war starts. There would be no margin of time for making additional soldiers out of the willing but untrained. The Nation would be forced to call again upon the veterans of the recent war to take the field a second time. By then, the weapons and tactics of modern warfare would be largely unfamiliar to them. The rifle training of an ex-infantryman would be of little use if he were handed, for the first time, a shoulder-fired 75-mm recoilless gun. The ex-pursuit pilot, expert with a 350-mile an hour plane, would be helpless in a 700-mile an hour battle with jet-propelled craft.

A push-button, Army-less, robot war is a fantasy of the far future. Experience has proved that the more mechanized war becomes, the more urgently men are needed, and the more thorough and technical their training must be. Weapons change, but they still must be employed by men familiar with their use. With the certainty of a lightning-swift attack and

follow-through in any future war, there is no alternative to the maintenance of a constant reservoir of trained soldiers. Since a standing Regular Army of several million men is completely out of the question, on a basis of cost, if nothing else, the only answer is a vast pool of trained civilians.

Not only is this the most economical answer, it is the logical answer in a democracy, where every able-bodied male citizen owes the obligation to his country of protecting it in an emergency. UMT would establish a national military policy which is entirely within the financial capabilities of our peacetime economy and which is entirely democratic in its nature. It would also place the world on notice that this trained manpower, linked to our tremendous resources, is immediately available. There would be, then, at least a hope that all nations would respect our strength. We must never again be led into the serious fallacy of trying to promote peace by setting an example of helplessness.

The estimated annual cost of UMT would be less than the cost of two days of any world war of the future. Respected authorities believe that, had UMT been in operation before World War II, the conflict might have been shortened by one year, saving about 90 billion dollars. Four days of World War II, in 1945, cost more than one billion dollars. The entire UMT program is expected to cost less than one billion dollars a year. The total sustaining cost of a continuous UMT program would be less than the interest, at $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, on the cost of six months of World War II in 1945.

The UMT plan to be submitted to the 80th Congress provides:

That able-bodied male civilians between the ages of 18 and 20 will receive military training for not more than one year, with several options which make it possible for the trainee to terminate his Army camp training at the end of six months. Deferment up to the age of 20 may be allowed young men still in high school; and voluntary induction at the age of 17 will be permitted, with parental consent, for those who have completed or left high school. Except for the mentally and physically unfit, no exemptions are planned.

Young men will enter this program for training only. They will remain civilians and will not be members of the military establishment; nor will they be available for combat or for any other operational requirements during their training. They will not be subject to the Articles of War, but will be governed by a special Code of Conduct, based on the recommendations

of a civilian advisory board. They will not be sent overseas and will not be liable for any future military service, except under a draft act passed by Congress in the event of another national emergency.

The War Department recognizes the necessity for establishing and fostering athletic, religious, educational, and recreational programs which will improve the mental, physical, and moral fiber of the trainees. Correspondence courses and self-study courses which lead to academic credits will be provided, so as to permit continuance of formal education. These broader aspects of the training program, which supplement the military phase, have been referred by the President to a nine-man Universal Training Commission, which includes leaders of industry, labor, religion, education, and science.

Personnel for conducting UMT training will be drawn from all the armed services, including the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps. Certain types of civilian specialists will be engaged; and UMT trainees, themselves, who show special aptitude and who desire to continue their training for the full year, will become trainers.

The training itself will contain as much practical military experience as can be packed into a limited course. The first six months will include intensive basic training combined with a beginning of branch and specialist training. A UMT experimental battalion has been organized at Fort Knox, Kentucky, under the supervision of Army Ground Forces. It will serve as a "pilot plant," testing the training plans, Code of Conduct, personnel needs, and other details of the UMT plan. Trainees are new Regular Army enlistees 18 to 20 years of age; and courses include training in the arms and services. The President's Universal Training Committee, members of Congress, and national leaders in other fields will be invited to inspect the unit; and other interested citizens are welcome.

At the completion of his first six-months general training, the trainee may exercise any of the following options:*

1. Remain in camp, under Army or Navy jurisdiction, for a further period of six months, in order to complete a full year of training.
2. Enlist in one of the armed services for a standard tour of enlistment.

* For detailed explanation, see *Facts* section of ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST, January 1947. Also "UMT Dry Run," in the same issue.

3. Enlist in the National Guard at any location.
4. Enlist in the Organized Reserve Corps, with assignment to a fully organized (Class A) unit.
5. Enter one of the service academies, at West Point or Annapolis.
6. Enlist in the Organized Reserve Corps, enter a college and enroll in a course (including ROTC) approved by the War Department, *with Government aid*. Under this option, the trainee agrees to accept a Reserve commission, if it is offered, at the completion of the course, and to perform active duty as a Reserve officer for a period of time as directed by the President.
7. Enlist in the Organized Reserve Corps, enter a college and enroll in a course (including ROTC), *without Government aid*. Under this option, the trainee agrees to accept a Reserve commission, if offered, at the completion of the course.
8. Enlist in the Organized Reserve Corps and complete an advanced technical course, *without Government aid*, in a school approved by the War Department.
9. Enlist in the Reserve Corps and complete an advanced technical course approved by the War Department, *with Government aid*, under an agreement to perform such service thereafter as the President may direct.

Universal Military Training is urgently needed by the Nation, to build up and maintain the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps, and to provide trained replacements for the veterans of World War II, in the general pool of trained manpower reserves.

A point to be emphasized is the impact of UMT on the Nation's educational system. In the first place, UMT supplies an incentive to graduate from high school. Secondly, it provides that many of the trainees with pronounced aptitudes will receive college or technical school scholarships in the form of Government aid. Finally, as indicated by current reports from colleges and schools, it will produce more mature, better disciplined college students, practiced in human relationships and with a better developed sense of values. These three by-products would be a distinct contribution to the normal educational processes of the country.

Twice the military staffs of our enemies have gambled on the relative slowness of our mobilization of men and materials. Each time they came dangerously close to being right. In World War I, they were blocked by the thin red line of *poilus*

at Verdun. In World War II, they were blocked by the immortal victory of the Royal Air Force and by the blood of millions of our allies, which bought us time. Time and space saved us—time to mobilize our industry, our agriculture, and our manpower; time to train the splendid military units which eventually brought us victory; and space over the vast oceans and the impenetrable Arctic wastes.

These historical advantages will not save us again. They were wiped out, almost overnight, by the late developments of World War II. The day of the musket is gone; but the day of the Minute Man has returned—with a vengeance. These modern Minute Men must be instantly ready for their complex tasks in the event of another threat to our Nation.

For the national security, UMT is the only sound alternative to a large standing Army, which nobody wants, and which would cost far more than the training plan proposed.

AID

Future Articles on Legislation and the New Army

This special section on "Legislation and the New Army" will be supplemented in following issues of the ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST by articles dealing with specific proposals as they will be presented to the Congress by the War Department.

It is suggested that this issue of the ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST be kept accessible for reference in connection with later articles.

INFORMATION AT SAPPORO

By

MAJOR RAYMOND C. DURGAN

EVERY week, several hundred paratroopers stationed in and near Sapporo, in northern Japan, drop in at the mid-town Information and Education Center, to enroll in USAFI courses, to learn about the benefits due them under the G. I. Bill of Rights, to find out what provisions their states have made for returning soldiers, to bone up on current news, and to size up the job situation back home. They want the answers, and they get them; for the 11th Airborne Division has adequately stocked the Center with reference materials and has staffed it with capable and informed attendants.

The Center covers most of the second-floor lobby of the Red Cross Club, and is divided into several sections, including a complete USAFI reference library, a current events bulletin board, a magazine rack containing a wide range of technical publications, and a section where visiting troops list their signatures in state "guest" books. A display of USAFI textbooks and courses, which are available from the Tokyo B Branch, covers one wall. One side of the lobby opens into a large, restful reading room, containing plenty of easy chairs, magazines, a radio, and a piano. A writing room is available on the other side of the lobby. The Center is open twelve hours a day, from 1000 to 2200, seven days a week.

The Center obtains its material through normal military channels, chiefly through Eighth Army distribution. The *Octagram Digest* supplies the Center with *Occupational Briefs*, and with news of state benefits for veterans. Monthly magazine kits provide up-to-date information on business opportunities

MAJOR RAYMOND C. DURGAN, INF., is the information-education officer of the 11th Airborne Division.

and give other vital news of interest to troops. The Pacific edition of *Stars and Stripes*, the *Static Line* (11th Airborne Division news sheet), and news broadcasts from the nearby Armed Forces Radio Service station, WLKD, are sources that enable the sergeant in charge, and his assistant, to keep the bulletin boards posted with timely information.

One bulletin board contains a large map of the world, around which are posted smaller maps of countries and areas prominent in the news. News clippings, posters, pictures from the *National Geographic*, and background news features are displayed on a ledge and on the bulletin board. Together they present a concise visual picture of current world happenings.

Opposite this current events section is a bulletin board devoted to news of business and industry, while a display shelf nearby contains the latest technical magazines. These publications are available for use, in the reading room or library, by interested 'troopers. Two smaller bulletin boards in the lobby present highlights from *Occupational Briefs* and details of veterans' benefits.

A popular attraction is the home-state bulletin board, dominated by a sizable map of the United States and surrounded



State guest books attract interest at the 11th Airborne Information Center.

by smaller, sectional maps and pictures of familiar home-state landmarks which exert a universal appeal. Soldiers cluster around a ledge-desk to make entries in their respective state guest books. The guest books are being thumbed through continually by 11th Airborne men and by newly arrived replacements in search of acquaintances from their home towns. Often, men who come in to check on the location of their home-state friends are attracted to other parts of the Center. Thus the guest books fulfill a dual purpose.

The USAFI reference library is a three-shelf affair, crammed with a complete set of USAFI textbooks and other reference works—encyclopedias, dictionaries, and almanacs. A glance through the USAFI textbooks in this compact little library has often influenced a man to enroll for study. The books, which illustrate the nature of the training offered, are convincing spokesmen for enrollment in United States Armed Forces Institute courses.

At a desk in front of the reference library, an I&E attendant is constantly on duty, answering inquiries, accepting applications, and keeping the bulletin boards up to date. The vocational guidance kit which he maintains is readily accessible to interested persons. Complete texts of the G. I. Bill of Rights are also available for the soldiers' study.

The Center's strategic location, in the second-floor lobby of one of Sapporo's main recreational clubs, flanked by the Special Services library and writing and reading rooms, was an important factor in assuring its success. Advance publicity over station WLKD and in the *Static Line* helped advertise the Center to the troops stationed in the vicinity. When the Center was opened, on 1 June, over three hundred soldiers flocked in during the first week. By the end of that week, a record number of forty-five USAFI applications had been sent to the Tokyo Branch.

In the ensuing months, the Center became identified to the Sapporo soldier as the logical place to look for guidance on his educational or vocational problems. Between two hundred and three hundred paratroopers continue to visit the 11th Airborne Information Center each week, and there is no sign of let-down in interest. By keeping the 11th Airborne soldier informed, and by cheerfully answering his questions on matters of general information, career planning, and educational advisement, the Center continues its practical role in furtherance of the Army's occupational mission.

MEN WITH GOD

Official photographs taken in the field by
the Army Signal Corps.



No physical courage and no brute instincts can take the place of the divine annunciation and spiritual uplift which will alone sustain him.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army



MANILA

ITALY





NEW GEORGIA

ENGLAND





ITALY



NORMANDY

CASERTA



ARMY EDUCATION PAYS OFF

By

LIEUTENANT COLONEL K. E. OBERHOLTZER, RESERVE

HAS Army education paid off? From the standpoint of a superintendent of schools, I can answer decidedly in the affirmative.

Recently I participated in commencement exercises in which 533 veterans were awarded high school diplomas as a result of having passed the General Education Development tests, administered either in the service or shortly after discharge. These tests, together with the "Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences in the Armed Service," have amply justified the Army Education Program, by enabling thousands of veterans to resume their education, with credits granted for their experience and education acquired in the armed services.

A survey conducted among California high schools in April 1946 revealed that more than 86 per cent of the schools had adopted the State Board recommendation that honorably discharged veterans who successfully complete the General Education Development test, and who meet other state and school requirements, be granted diplomas. As a result, thousands of veterans have been graduated from high school.

The success of this program has been even more noticeable in the colleges. The Long Beach City College, for example, has more than 2000 veterans enrolled. Of this number, nine per cent have presented transcripts of credit for courses completed with the United States Armed Forces Institute, and

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENNETH E. OBERHOLTZER, Reserve, is Superintendent of Schools, Long Beach, California. During the war, he was on the staff of the Education Branch, Information and Education Division, War Department, where he was instrumental in formulating the Army Education Program.

have received credit. Neighboring colleges show a similar percentage of acceptance.

Individual examples are even more striking. One young man left college as a sophomore, and, after serving three years in the Army, returned with senior standing. Among the credits granted him for his Army work were nine units for courses in Philosophy of Education, Modern History, and American Foreign Policy, taken while he attended the Army University Study Center at Biarritz, France. While at the Army university center overseas, he became so interested in the field of foreign policy that he has chosen it as his career.

Another young man enlisted while he was a sophomore in high school, and, during his four and a half years of duty, including the European and Asiatic theaters, completed several USAFI courses, finishing part of one in a hospital. He was awarded a high school diploma upon completion of the General Education Development test and evaluation of the courses, and is now enrolled in Long Beach City College, where he is preparing to enter law school.

The Army Education Program has also helped teachers in maintaining their professional seniority status upon return from military service. Under standards established by the Army Education Program, experience credit has been granted to newly employed teachers who acquired their instructional experience while in service. New teachers hired at Long Beach, for example, have been accorded full credit for their Army teaching experience, with the result that they often gain three additional years' experience-rating on the salary schedule.

After seeing the Army Education Program take form in the War Department, it is a rewarding experience today to participate in the civilian educational phase where the dividends of foresight are being paid off. Already, the policy of having men with sound educational backgrounds establish the standards for Army education has resulted in widespread acceptance of these standards by civilian educational institutions.

Commanding officers and information-education officers may derive considerable satisfaction from the knowledge that their endeavors have resulted in material benefits, in the form of time saved and educational credits gained, by thousands of veterans returning to schools and colleges.

FRONT LINE CORRESPONDENTS

By

MAJOR HAL D. STEWARD

SINCE VJ Day, war correspondents and Army public relations officers have been saying unkind things about each other. Why has neither side gotten around to acknowledging the other's good points? I, for one, have known many war correspondents who did their level best to give the American public a true and honest picture of the war—men who braved enemy fire and some who gave their lives, so that the folks at home would know what combat is really like.

When 1st Cavalry Division troops smashed through the outer defenses of Manila and liberated some 3,700 civilian internees imprisoned in Santo Tomas University, it wasn't a soldier who rushed across the campus first to enter the main building of the university. It was two war correspondents, Frank Hewlett of United Press and Carl Mydans of *Life*. Inside Santo Tomas, Frank's wife had spent 37 months as a prisoner of the Japs. Carl and his wife, Shelley, were themselves prisoners in the university during the first eight months of the war. Mydans had helped direct the Cavalry column through the streets to the notorious internment camp.

Hewlett and Mydans were not the only correspondents with that flying column of cavalrymen that undertook one of the greatest gambles of the war. Fourteen correspondents, altogether, were members of the column.

Two months before, four correspondents had given their lives on Leyte while covering the front-line war. Stanley Gunn of the Fort Worth, Texas, *Star-Telegram*; John Terry of the Chicago *News*, and Ace Bush of the Associated Press had come

MAJOR HAL D. STEWARD, Cavalry, is associate editor of the *Armored Cavalry Journal*. During the war, he was public relations officer of the 1st Cavalry Division.

ashore with the 1st Cavalry, on 20 October 1945. None were farther behind than the third assault wave. Six days later, they were killed by a Jap bomb. A few weeks later, Frank Prist, Acme photographer, was killed by a Jap sniper.

While Francis McCarthy of United Press and Jack Dowling of the *Chicago Sun* were with the 1st Cavalry Division, there wasn't a single action that these two men were not on the spot to witness—often in advance of the front-line troops. Dowling broke both of his legs in making a combat jump with a paratroop unit on Luzon. Frank Smith of the *Chicago Times* was a qualified paratrooper and made several combat jumps, although he was 20 years older than most of the troops.

Perhaps some correspondents covering the war had comfortable beds and hot food, while the battles were being fought up front. But the men I am writing about slept in their ponchos, got soaked in the rain like other soldiers, and ate their meals out of a "K" ration box or a "C" ration can. They complained about censorship every now and then, but a soldier also complains about the censorship of his letters. They complained about having to sleep in the rain, but so does a soldier.

These correspondents learned at first hand how terrible the drudgery of war can be. They put what they had seen into news dispatches, so that the people at home could know a little better what war is actually like. Correspondents like James Hutcheson of the Associated Press wrote stories about the men who had to carry rations on their backs up the rugged mountains of western Leyte so that their units might eat.

Fourteen war correspondents were given official commendations by Major General Verne D. Mudge, former commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, for their bravery in covering the war from the front lines. Several others were awarded the Purple Heart for wounds received in the Southwest Pacific.

Little has been heard about the exploits of these men. It is time they were recognized; because they were the front-line correspondents.

KEEPING INFORMED ON MILITARY LEGISLATION

"Digest of Legislation," a department of THE DIGEST summarizing the military legislation enacted by the Congress, will be resumed at an early date. This department, prepared by the Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department, is designed to keep DIGEST readers informed of legislative action affecting the military establishment.

THE ARMY'S CLOTHES LINE

By

COLONEL FREDERICK H. KOERBEL

WHEN the Army was at its peak domestic strength in 1944, its laundry output was so tremendous that, had one been able to hang up the year's work at one time, the clothes line would have circled the globe at the equator 25 times. In the fiscal year 1944, Quartermaster Corps plants processed a total of 2,150,514,000 pieces of wash and dry-cleaning, or more than one article for every human being on the face of the earth. And this staggering figure does not include the work done by mobile units abroad, or that of an additional 13 per cent of fixed-type laundries which were unable to make reports because of shortages in clerical personnel.

Seventy-one per cent of the processed articles came directly out of the laundry bundles of troops, the remainder being Government bulk work from hospitals and other installations. Had one been able to stack these 78,539,481 soldier laundry bundles on top of each other, they would have towered 3711 times as high as Pike's Peak.

Today, with the Army nearing its peacetime size, these figures are down 80 per cent, but they still dwarf those of similar civilian enterprises, including the largest chains. Operating as near to cost as feasible, a procedure which enables the soldier to have clean clothes for an average of \$2.00 a month (\$1.50 per month prior to 1 July 1946), the Quartermaster Laundry Branch has been able, during the past four years, to return to the Treasury 66 cents of every Army dollar spent in the operation of its establishments. Considering the amount of bulk organizational work, for which there was

COLONEL FREDERICK H. KOERBEL, QMC, is Chief, Laundry Branch, Office of the Quartermaster General. He served on this assignment throughout the war, and has been with the Branch for the past eight years.

no monetary return, this means that Army laundries are virtually self-supporting, and, in relation to an estimated 43 per cent higher civilian rate which would have been paid had bulk work been sent outside, actually make money for the Government.

In no respect, however, does the Army compete with civilian laundries. Its policy, both in peace and in war, is to lease, purchase, or build plants only when civilian facilities are considered unsatisfactory. During its peak period, the Laundry Branch had 290 fixed establishments, constituting the greatest and most far-flung laundry chain in the history of the world. It employed approximately 25,000 persons, of whom more than 87 per cent were civilians, the balance including military personnel and prisoners of war.

Today, with the number of facilities in this country reduced to 92, of which 30 are inactive, the hectic quest for labor has abated, and the emphasis has shifted to overseas. Where fighting troops, of necessity, had to be satisfied with the rough-dry service of mobile units, every effort is now being made to give occupational soldiers the completely finished service of a first-rate Stateside laundry. There are 94 plants in operation overseas, serving troops in Germany, Italy, Japan and other areas of concentration, and an additional 26 plants are under construction. Native civilian personnel are employed whenever possible, although language barriers and native customs offer their usual obstacles. Most of the plants operate on a regular delivery schedule of four days to the individual, and 24 hours to the hospitals.

The importance of having adequate laundry service has always been recognized. A great morale-building factor during the war was the appearance of mobile units close to the fighting front. Set up in 10-ton trailers, and operated exclusively by soldiers, these mobile laundries would draw their water supply from any convenient stream and begin turning out wash for battle-begrimed fighters. So eager were American troops to keep clean that, happening upon one of these mobile units, they would often strip on the spot and stand naked until their clothes were washed. Almost 2000 mobile units were purchased by the Quartermaster Corps for use in every sector of the globe. During one year alone, they turned out a combined total of more than 350,000,000 rough-dry pieces.

Mobile laundries also supplemented the fixed type on occasions, especially when sudden troop concentrations threatened


to overtax permanent facilities. By utilizing mobile units to relieve the great strain on the local plant, Quartermaster laundry personnel were able to keep the American soldier in clean clothing despite emergency conditions.

Although portable laundries are now used only in remote sections of the world, where there are small troop concentrations and inadequate native facilities, the Quartermaster Corps, aware that any future war will see an even greater rapidity of movement, has continued to develop new and swifter-travelling units. It has a skid-mounted airborne laundry, capable of turning out 40 pounds of rough-dry wash per hour, which can be operated by a single person and transported in a C-47 or glider. In two sections, together weighing only 2500 pounds, with an overall height of 59 inches, this compact unit was developed at the request of the Army Air Forces. It is designed for use in advanced bases, or by small detachments, and is particularly adapted for island-hopping tactics. It will serve the needs of 600 men.

The Quartermaster Corps has also modified its original single-van-type mobile unit, dividing it into two trailers which can be easily moved by standard service trucks over almost any kind of terrain. Where the wartime unit weighed 20,000 pounds and was pulled by a 5-ton tractor-truck, the new models weigh only 5000 pounds per trailer, yet retain the capacity to turn out 120 pounds of wash per hour. One of the trailers carries the water heater, washer, drain bin, extractor, electric auxiliary pump, and gasoline tanks. The other trailer contains the drying tumbler, air heater, tool box, a gasoline tank, 250 feet of rubber-covered hose, and the gasoline-driven generator which supplies the power. Burners for heating air and water are designed to operate with either standard or aviation gasoline. By removing the wheels from the trailers, one can transport the unit in a C-47 airplane or a CG-13 glider. Remembering that laundry personnel were forced to withdraw twice within 24 hours in the battle of Kasserine Pass, and later had to follow General Patton across Europe, it is at once apparent that mobility is a highly desirable factor.

Fixed-type laundries vary in size, depending on the strength of the post, camp, or station they serve. In the United States, 20,000- and 10,000-man installations are more prevalent, whereas overseas they are usually of 5000- and 2500-man capacity. Normally, a company-grade officer is the laundry officer. He is seldom assigned to a facility that serves fewer

The Army's Clothes Line Stretches to the Field



Two types of Army laundries in the field are pictured here. The mobile type (above), invaluable in the emergencies of war, is being supplanted by the fixed type (below), to provide service of Stateside caliber for troops stationed overseas.



Official U. S. Army Signal Corps Photos

than 5000 soldiers. He usually has had civilian laundry experience, although special training is always given to him by the Army.

Today Army laundries are back to a one-shift operation, but during the war they frequently maintained two shifts, and, on occasion, worked around the clock. At Fort Bragg, great basic training center, there were two 20,000-man laundries and one pre-war unit for 2500 men. One of these laundries, employing 955 civilians and working around the clock, did a total of more than eleven million pieces of wash and dry-cleaning during a period of three months in 1943. The other 20,000-man plant was not far behind. Combining this output with that of the pre-war plant, the total volume for Fort Bragg made the average big-city laundry look small. In fact, the only civilian establishments matching this total were the great ones in the New York, California, and Chicago areas.

It has been found that around-the-clock operations are not satisfactory because of the difficulty experienced in maintenance and repair of machinery. Aware of this fact even before the war, the Laundry Branch planned to obtain or build enough units so that all the work could be carried on a one-shift basis; but shortages in construction materials soon caused a modification of this plan.

While Army-operated laundries were not entirely unknown even prior to World War I, the number of such installations was negligible. Most posts and garrisons either sent their clothing to commercial plants or gave the work to wash-women who came into camp every week for this purpose. At the beginning of World War II, there were only 35 fixed laundries operated under supervision of the Quartermaster Corps. With thousands of new soldiers entering the Army daily, military and commercial facilities were soon buried under an avalanche of dirty clothing, especially those located in areas containing, in addition to the Army camps, large war plants. The situation demanded immediate action, which the Laundry Branch met with its three-fold plan of leasing, purchasing, or constructing.

A good example of Army cooperation with commercial facilities was the handling of the laundry problem in Miami at the outbreak of the war. That fall, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Miami laundry owners complacently looked forward to the usual tourist trade for the winter. Suddenly

the city found itself virtually a military post, as thousands of soldiers poured into the area for training. Bewildered at first by the sudden mass migration, Miami laundry owners recovered sufficiently to consult with the Army and work out an arrangement which has since come to be known as the "Miami Plan." First, surveys of existing facilities were made and anticipated requirements studied. Then a new corporation, Service Laundries, Inc., owned cooperatively by 33 participating Miami firms, was formed. With this closely knit organization and some excellent Army cooperation, the difficult problem of providing laundry for thousands of soldiers was finally solved.

Effectiveness of the cooperative plan depended primarily on common-sense planning. Pick-up and delivery problems had to be overcome and price rates made uniform. It was necessary to give precise instructions regarding assembling of clothing and its dispatch on Army trucks under a rigid time schedule. As is customary, each military unit was required to submit its laundry on a definite day and at a definite time, uniformly assembled in barracks bags, and accompanied by a detailed listing of contents. Army trucks then took the bags to the designated laundry, picked up the completed bundles, and returned them to the barracks for delivery to the men. An expedited service was set up to handle the work of soldiers suddenly up for transfer. Within a comparatively short time, chaos was averted, and the emergency was reduced to a routine.

Although Army laundries have few basic differences from commercial enterprises, there are certain characteristics and methods of procedure peculiar to the military plants. For example, the Army has its own system of laundry marks—the first letter of the soldier's last name and the final four digits of his serial number. Since the clothing of troops is subjected to much rough field wear, special washing formulas are necessary. Nothing is left to chance, not even the number of minutes required to wash, for example, greasy denims or heavily soiled work clothes. Attached to each washer in a Quartermaster Corps laundry is a standard holder containing the Army's formulas and a classification chart. Washmen are required to display the card containing the formula for the clothes being washed. Thus, the superintendent can tell, at a glance, whether the correct formula is being used, and can easily judge the progress of the operation.

Using seven standard formulas, Quartermaster Corps laundries make provisions for everything, from clean white work, such as sheets and pillow cases, to woolen blankets and cotton-filled comforters. Regulations specify the temperature of the water, the length of time required for the operation, and even the physical handling of the articles. The entire operation is controlled, from the moment the clothing is received at the plant to the time it is loaded on trucks, packaged and prepared for delivery.

American soldiers have a tradition of cleanliness, and, during the war, Army engineers and Quartermaster Corps laundry personnel often went to great lengths to help them keep clean. Ingenuity was exercised especially in providing laundry facilities for the men working on the Ledo Road, in the jungles of upper Assam and Burma. With soldiers' uniforms drenched in perspiration, and with monsoons smearing them with mud, everything possible had to be done to provide troops with freshly cleaned and pressed clothing. Merely to house the laundry unit in this wilderness was a problem, for, before Army engineers could do any building, lumber had to be shipped 15,000 miles from the United States. It took five months of constant battle against the elements to complete the work. Machines and equipment also had to be procured from the States before the laundry could be put in operation. Even the matter of obtaining water, incongruous as it may seem, with monsoons threatening to wash the operation out at any moment, proved to be a special problem. After striking hard rock strata in their digging, the engineers were forced to devise an ingenious system for pumping water from a river more than 700 yards away. In the end, however, the harried road builders were enjoying service of a Stateside caliber.

In Southern Italy, American soldiers were equally resourceful. When heavy wind and rain storms damaged considerable tentage, muddying and ripping combat clothing, the Quartermaster laundry unit took advantage of an unoccupied spaghetti factory. Using the same facilities which previously had been utilized to develop the correct crispness in spaghetti, these laundry units quickly dried the clothing and successfully met the emergency.

When no laundry service was available, the troops took the matter in their own hands. During the early days of the war, scores of home-made washing machines dotted the beaches

of the Central Pacific islands, where everyone, from general to private, did his own laundry and wore it rough-dried. With the campaign moving rapidly from island to island, laundry was always a problem. One officer described the construction and operation of a typical home-made washer. "We took a fifty-five gallon drum, cut off the top, and made a crude windmill above it. The windmill was hooked to a drive-shaft which caused a wooden paddle to churn up and down in the drum filled with water, soap, and our dirty clothes. An hour or so of this churning left the clothes free of dirt, perspiration, grease, or anything else picked up in combat. The windmills operated well because of the ever-present winds of the Central Pacific. The clothes were hung out in the sun and wind, and dried rapidly."

Today the tempo has slowed considerably, and emergencies so typical of wartime are few; but the Laundry Branch continues to experiment with new ideas and improved methods of procedure. With a great backlog of experience gained from World War II, it is preparing to meet any situation the new Army may be called upon to face in the future.



Official U. S. Army Signal Corps Photo

Under wartime conditions in the field, ingenious devices for laundering were improvised, such as the motorcycle-powered unit above.

INTRODUCTION TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT

*One of a series of articles
describing the mission and
functions of agencies of the
War Department.*

THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU AT WORK

By

MAJOR RALPH E. PEARSON

THE office of the National Guard Bureau is a busy spot these days. Not only will the new National Guard be three times its pre-war size, but it must be ready for immediate action. In any future war, the Guard will be part of the M-Day effective force, ready to go into action the moment hostilities start. That calls for a tight, swift-action, efficient team in the Bureau.

National Guard policy is determined by the War Department General Staff Committee on National Guard Policy. It does the overall planning, determining where the Guard fits into the national defense plan and what its mission shall be. From there, the National Guard Bureau carries on, implementing the policy and representing the War Department in dealing with the States and Territories. The National Guard is a joint responsibility of the Federal Government and the various states. The Guard receives pay and equipment from the Government; it is organized and equipped on the tables of organization and equipment used by the Regular Army; its training programs are on the same level; its officers are subject to an age-in-grade policy; and its personnel must meet the same physical and professional standards as those of the Regular establishment. It must always be ready for instant mobilization. All these matters are of direct concern to the National Guard Bureau.

MAJOR RALPH E. PEARSON, (INF.), NGB, is Chief, Information Office, National Guard Bureau, War Department Special Staff. Previous to this assignment, he was Chief, Information Section, Headquarters, Replacement and School Command, Fort Bragg.

In the first year of postwar reorganization, due to determined leadership of the state adjutants general and general officers of the Guard, and as a result of the indefatigable work of National Guard Bureau personnel, 6,314 units have been accepted by the States and Territories, and more than half of these already have been federally recognized. It is expected that 72,000 National Guard officers and men will be ready for field training in 1947, and that by 1 July 1947, there will be 240,000 enrolled in the Guard, being trained and awaiting federal recognition of their units. Total authorized strength of the new Guard is 682,000, trained, equipped, and ready for action on M-Day.

Reconversion started in October 1945, when the Secretary of War approved the postwar National Guard policy prepared by the General Staff Committee on National Guard Policy. In January 1946, the reorganization plan prepared by the National Guard Bureau was approved, and in February the National Guard Troop Basis was presented by the Bureau to the States and Territories for their individual acceptance. Reorganization has been under way, therefore, for about a year, starting slowly at first and now going forward at a snowball pace.

It has been a heavy year for the Bureau, spark plug of the whole operation. The Bureau administers and supervises all War Department functions pertaining to the Guard, except training (which is a responsibility of the Commanding Generals, Ground and Air Forces). If Congress authorizes any other militia of state or territorial troops (such as State Guards, which held the home front staunchly during the war), the Bureau's responsibility extends to them as well. Under this broad responsibility, here are some of the things the Bureau must do:

- a. Prepare estimates of Federal funds necessary for equipping, maintaining, operating, and training the Guard—and justify those estimates before the Congress.
- b. Propose changes in Guard policies, regulations, and laws affecting the Guard.
- c. Prepare National Guard Regulations and those Army Regulations of primary interest to the National Guard and the State Guards.
- d. Supervise the supply and maintenance of Federal property authorized for the Guard.
- e. Initiate action for the War Department to extend Federal

recognition to qualified units of the Guard, and to officers and warrant officers; and to withdraw recognition, where necessary.

f. Assist the States in preparing plans for conversion, redesignation, and change of location of Guard units.

g. Prepare and distribute National Guard Bureau circulars and administrative instructions; and maintain records concerning National Guard personnel, units, equipment, armament and federal funds.

h. Maintain cordial relations between the War Department and the military establishments of the States and Territories.

This places a heavy responsibility on the Bureau. The Guard must provide units equipped, trained, and available for immediate service in any climate, under any combat conditions—defensive or offensive. Supervision and administration must recognize not only the domestic allocation of the Guard—so that it will be equitably distributed in relation to the population and be able to fulfill its secondary mission (as a state force under the individual governors) of providing local security and disaster relief—but also that it will be prepared for duty anywhere on the globe, if a national emergency is declared. It must provide, too, for supplying the Guard with the latest weapons developed by scientific research and development. It must insure that the Guard will be a balanced force, functionally, ready to take the field with completely organized tactical units and supporting services. The Guard is organized into divisions, wings, regiments, squadrons, and other units which are standard for the Regular Army. During peacetime, Guard units and installations are under the supervision of the Army or Air Force commander within whose geographical jurisdiction they are located. When ordered into federal service, they automatically become part of the command of those officers. The new National Guard will include 25 infantry divisions, two armored divisions, 20 regimental combat teams, and supporting units normally found in the ground forces. Air units will include 12 wings, 27 groups, and 84 squadrons, together with supporting units.

A war of the future will come swiftly and devastatingly. It will be no respecter of coast-lines. The advantages of time and space will no longer protect us during mobilization. We must be ready—instantly. That places an unprecedented responsibility on the new National Guard. It must provide the Minute Men of the future.

I&E NEWS LETTER

*Prepared by the staff of the
Information and Education
Division, War Department
Special Staff.*

INFORMATION

Army Talk

Army Talks are most effective, in stimulating group interest and participation in the discussion process, when the selected topic has a close and vital relationship to the problems with which the group is concerned. Often, during discussion of a particular *Army Talk*, considerable interest is evoked in related problems, issues, and topics. This upsurge of interest and response may well serve as a guide in the preparation of future *Talks*. Discussion leaders, who are in key positions to observe reactions, opinions, and basic interests of their groups, are urged to submit to the Information and Education Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., suggestions and criticisms, based on their experiences, which might be valuable in the planning and preparation of future *Army Talks*.

The I&E Division will welcome the critical opinions of discussion leaders as to the value and use of the visual aids presented in *Army Talk*. Comments are desired particularly on these queries: Are the visual aids pertinent? Are there enough of them? Are they easy to reproduce or enlarge? Are their messages grasped readily by the discussion groups? Do they increase the ease of presentation?

Available Background Materials

Attention is again directed to the background materials of books, pamphlets, and maps which may be requisitioned through I&E Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. I&E officers, who desire to stock these materials for use in libraries and information centers, should forward their requisitions promptly, since stocks are being exhausted rapidly. Requests for any of the following available materials should also include the identifying code and stock numbers:

Maps

AOM for World Polar Projection—No. 104
Philippine Islands—No. 118
Southeast China—No. 120
United States—No. 127
World Atlas Maps for Americans—No. 338
World Atlas Maps (M-101)—No. 349
China, Burma, India—No. 353
East Indies (1)—No. 394A
East Indies (2)—No. 394B
Japan (AMS 5204)—No. 408
China—No. 440
Map of the World, National Geographic Society.
Pocket Atlas of the World

Pamphlets

Leadership—No. 209
Shortened History of England—No. 210
Shortened History of American Democracy P. B.—No. 213B
Island Victory—No. 316
Island Peoples of the Western Pacific (Smithsonian Institute Pamphlet No. 16)—No. 367
Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall—No. 460
Iwo Jima—No. 463
General Eisenhower's Statement—No. 535
Report of the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff—No. 558
How to Use Your Eyes at Night
Leadership and the Negro Soldier
Peoples of India—(Smithsonian Institute Pamphlet No. 18)

EDUCATION

Central School Activities in Korea

A Central School at Seoul, Korea, was organized in December 1945, under the Commanding Officer, Special Troops, XXIV Corps. In the seven terms since its inception, the School has enrolled approximately 4000 students. The increase in the

number of faculty members has been continuous, with professionally experienced civilians replacing discharged servicemen on the faculty. School equipment and improvements of the school plant have kept pace with multiplying needs. Changes in the curriculum have been made from time to time to provide for essential Army requirements and also to meet changing student demands. Recently, all daytime instruction has been devoted solely to courses prescribed by military needs. The evening courses have been made available to volunteer students who are seeking educational improvement.

All courses at the Central School extend for six weeks. Upon completion of an End-of-Course test with a satisfactory grade, the student receives a certificate issued by the Army Education Program (AEP). The record of successful completion of the course is entered in the enlisted man's Service Record, as well as on his Soldier's Qualification Card (Form 20). The student may submit the AEP certificate to his State-side school, which will determine the amount of academic credit that will be granted.

European Theater Educational Opportunities

Excellent educational opportunities are presently available to military personnel in the European theater, according to Lt. Col. Harry C. Eckhoff, Executive Officer, Education Branch, I&E Division, War Department, who visited I&E schools in the European theater during December.

Enrollment reports reveal that 1549 individuals are taking courses at the I&E Command Schools located at Berlin, Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Bremen. Following are individual enrollments for the four areas: Berlin 332, Heidelberg 675, Frankfurt 303, Bremen 239. One hundred and thirty-six German and American civilian instructors are employed in the four schools mentioned.

Approximately forty subjects on high school and junior-college level are offered in these four Command Schools. Literacy training is also conducted on duty time for all men whose Soldier's Qualification Card (Form 20) shows completion of less than the fifth grade of school, or shows an Army General Classification Test score of grade V. Classes, for the most part, are conducted during off-duty time, principally in the evening. Participation is on a voluntary basis,

Typical of the educational facilities available are those of the Army Education Center, Berlin. The four well-equipped buildings house an outstanding science laboratory; a 5,000 volume library, which is open seven days a week; and two studios complete with record players, language records and books. Studios for record playing are open daily from 1300 to 2130; and language record kits are available on a loan basis. Private instruction is offered in piano, voice, violin, accordion and harmony. In addition, there are coffee lounges and tennis courts for the students' recreation. Excellent facilities are available for an industrial and education program.

Army education centers sponsored by the European theater I&E Headquarters are in the process of establishment at Stuttgart, Nuremburg, and Wiesbaden.

The European theater USAFI branch reports an active enrollment of 7,500. New enrollments average approximately 1200 a month. A USAFI field service trailer, stocked with educational materials, travels from unit to unit and is responsible for from one-third to one-half of the new enrollments. A second trailer is being similarly equipped and will be ready for service in January 1947.

Third Army Headquarters reports a total of 68 unit schools in operation, having a total enrollment of 4860. A recent Third Army education survey indicates that five per cent of the white troops and thirteen per cent of the Negro troops are attending classes at Information and Education schools.

Other findings of the educational survey revealed that:

83 per cent of the present troops in the Third Army are less than 25 years of age.

55 per cent are less than 20 years of age.

11 per cent have 6 years or less of formal education.

78 per cent have 7 years or more of formal education, through high school.

5 per cent have more than a high school education.

6 per cent gave no reply.

34 per cent indicated they would attend Army education centers to further their own education.

75 per cent thought off-duty schools a good idea.

50 per cent desired American civilian instructors.

39 per cent desire trade or technical subjects.

80 per cent desire academic credit for their work.

An I&E Staff School has been in continuous operation at Hoechst, Germany since January 1946. The six-days' course

of instruction deals with the mission and objectives of the I&E program. Approximately 50 individuals from various European theater commands are in attendance each week. To date, 3223 have attended the school.

USAFI Catalog and Supplements

The third edition of the USAFI Catalog, dated 1 July 1946, has been widely distributed, and should now be in the hands of nearly all interested persons. Additional copies may be obtained from the nearest Adjutant General Depot, or by addressing the Commandant, USAFI, Madison 3, Wisconsin.

To date, two supplements of the Catalog have been issued; the first, in USAFI Information Letter No. 22, dated 1 November 1946; and the second, as Inclosure No. 1 to a Special Information Letter from USAFI, dated 13 November 1946.

USAFI Enrollments

Headquarters, USAFI, reports that there are now 341,793 active students studying USAFI courses. For the month of November, there were 2813 new enrollments for correspondence courses, 3079 for education manuals, and 350 for courses with cooperating universities and colleges.

These figures indicate that interest in USAFI courses continues on the upgrade. A rise in the percentage of course completions also is noted.

RADIO REVIEW

New Titles in AFRS Original Programs

The Wanderers, a series concerned with displaced persons, has added to its productions "Country Doctor," concerning Paul Stepanovski, a Polish doctor whose career was ended by the war, and "Encore," which tells the story of a concert pianist. New titles in production are "The Child's Wish" and "Heritage." The latter story compares the difficulties of the present displaced persons of Europe with those of the American pioneers.

The *GI Ambassador* series now includes "Look Up Yagato," dealing with Japanese-American relationships, and "The Revenge of Sergeant Moriarity," the story of the Bremen Boys' Club. "The New Arrival" and "The Bright Shining Uniform" are in production.

The *Pride of Outfit* series recently released "They Turned the Tide," a program honoring the First Marine Division.

FILM REVIEW

Army-Navy Screen Magazine

Issue Number 82 (running time 20 minutes) contains two subjects, "G. I. Quiz No. 3" and "Rain or Shine."

G. I. Quiz No. 3 presents the "Professor" with a third set of questions, some entertaining, some educational, such as, Who is the pocket billiard champion of America? or, Was 6 June 1944 the first date set for the Normandy invasion? Seven such questions are asked and answered.

Rain or Shine traces the importance of weather to the various campaigns of the war; the training of men in the science of weather prediction; and the remote places to which they were sent to staff the AAF weather stations throughout the world. The film concludes with a sequence on the new developments in weather prediction, now in the laboratory stage, showing the operation of automatic weather stations, recording and sending vital data to central stations miles away.

P R D NEWS LETTER

*Prepared by the staff of the
Public Relations Division, War
Department Special Staff.*

Six Years Old

The War Department Public Relations Division, formerly the Bureau of Public Relations, will celebrate its sixth anniversary on 11 February 1947, with a minimum of fanfare, flag waving, and self-congratulatory press releases.

It was on 11 February 1941 that Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced the formation, under his supervision and control, of a Bureau of Public Relations. All public relations and press agencies of the War Department were transferred to the new Bureau.

The two principal agencies affected by the reorganization were the Public Relations Branch, Office of the Chief of Staff, and the Current Information Section, Office of the Under

Secretary of War. Both had been operating independently, with frequent duplication of effort. Before July 1940, the Public Relations Branch, Office of the Secretary of War, was under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.

The officer assigned to head the new Bureau of Public Relations was Major General Robert C. Richardson, Jr. Subsequent Bureau directors were Major General Alexander D. Surles, Brigadier General Luther L. Hill, Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, and the incumbent, Major General Floyd L. Parks.

Among the nationally known personages who played major roles in the wartime growth of the Bureau were Colonels Albert L. Warner and Robert S. Allen. Colonel Warner, now news chief for Mutual Broadcasting System, was Chief, War Intelligence Division, charged with maintaining military security in the War Department's relations with all media of public information. Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby, Executive Vice President of the *Houston Post*, was assigned to the Bureau. She served as Chief, Women's Interests Section, until early in the war, when she became the first Director of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps.

New Radio Guide

The Radio Section, War Department Public Relations Division, has announced 1 February as the tentative issuance date of its new *Radio Guide*. This pamphlet supersedes the "Radio Guide for Public Relations Officers," dated 1 January 1945. It will be widely distributed by the Public Relations Division.

The major objectives of the Army radio programs, as stated in the new pamphlet, are:

- a. To keep the public informed.
- b. To show how the Army helps maintain the peace.
- c. To describe the Army's role in building a better Nation.
- d. To build prestige for the military service.

While the new *Guide* follows the general pattern of the earlier publication, it contains much material reflecting changing conditions in the field, particularly as they are affected by the relaxing of wartime restrictions and security controls.